When you launch a new collaborative business, it is worth determining in advance how much your partner is committed to achieving the common goal and what compensation is expected in the event of a breach of cooperation. Various examples in biological and social contexts have shown how common it is to conclude prior compensation agreements after the fact, indicating that this behaviour could have been shaped by natural selection. Here, we analyze the evolutionary relevance of such a engagement strategy and refer it to the costly punitive strategy in which no prior agreement is reached. We show that if the cost of negotiating a commitment agreement is within certain limits, it is possible to achieve a considerable level of cooperation. In addition, these levels are higher than those obtained by a simple expensive punishment, especially if you insist on splitting the cost of the arrangement. Not only do we show that good deals are good friends, but agreements based on common costs work better. Weinstein calls it „the Great One“ and advises explaining how partners will address disagreements. „There may be informal procedures, such as submitting disputes to a neutral and trustworthy consultant. Then, of course, there are more formal approaches – arbitration, mediation, etc.,“ he says. Partnership agreements are a good idea every time two or more people go something together,“ says Damien Weinstein of Weinstein-Klein, PC. „You`re basically a model for your partnership – what you can and can`t do, what your rights and duties are for each other and the company, how decisions are made, how partners are paid or compensated (if that`s the case), and especially how disputes can be resolved,“ Weinstein says. Letter T: Tra moglie e marito non ci mettere il dito. The literal translation is: „Between woman and man, don`t put your finger.“ The English equivalent is „Don`t walk between the tree and the bark“, and that means that in situations that are not yours, you should not bite your nose, especially when it comes to a married couple. This article aims to breathe new life into the relational theory of the treaty and to exacerbate some of its claims against its competitors by violating its theory of relational contracts by an analogy with friendship.
By making the analogy between friendships and relational contracts and revealing their morphological similarities, this article offers a provocative window into the contractual structure of friendship and in relational contracts, akin to friendships. The analogy developed here is ready to replace the „relational contract“ as the predominant marriage model among relationalists. This new model is more honest with relational theory of contracts and marriage and helps relational contract theory to produce some new discoveries, support the old ones and review some of its normative agenda. Conventional wisdom suggests that cooperative interactions are more likely to survive if all participants are aware of the expectations and possible consequences of their actions. All parties then clearly know what they are committing and may refuse such an obligation if the offer is made. A classic example of such an agreement is marriage1,2. In this case, mutual engagement ensures some stability in relationships, which reduces fear of exploitation and guarantees security against potential cataclysms. Of course, such agreements can be beneficial in many situations that are not limited to the type of formal and explicit contracts, as is the case with marriage.